As it turns out, there are some fundamental flaws either in the stimulus bill itself, or in the guidance issued yesterday by the Department of Education, that render it virtually useless as a vehicle for statewide education reform.
This may have merits in terms of providing a revenue stream for states and districts to backfill budgets and pay off debt. Things are tough out there, and this dynamic is perfectly understandable. But in terms of driving change in the 4 areas that Congress specified - standards and assessments, teacher effectiveness and the equitable distribution of teachers, data systems, and turning around underperforming schools - there no longer is any there there.
The stakes for the Secretary’s $5 billion "Race to the Top" fund have been raised substantially. In fact, it is now the only education reform game in town.
Most people had expected that there would be disagreement about how strong the guidance on stabilization funding was on issues like teacher performance and school restructuring. And the guidance could be much more rigorous, to say the least, in these and other areas. The flow chart we did yesterday illustrates what was the prevailing view that the guidance on these policies issues, as well as federal and state fiscal restraint on things like maintenance of effort and supplanting, would be the pivotal points in the link between between money and reform.
But the guidance issued yesterday introduces much more fundamental problems. Here are our top three:
1) Allocation Schedule Front-loaded: The Department had signaled originally that it would disperse 67% of of the stabilization funding now (within two weeks of state applications) and the remaining 33% in September. But yesterday’s guidance says that states may apply to receive up to 90% for Phase 1.
This is important because eligibility for Phase 2 funding is supposed to be based on how states do on key performance indices. The "carrot" of Phase 2 funding - for some, many, or most states - as an incentive to undertake robust reforms has now shrunk by more than two-thirds.
This could have an upside in that withholding 10% for states that do not make progress may be more viable politically than withholding 33%. Whether the Administration sets a high enough bar for Phase 2, and whether it is willing to ding states on Phase 2 allocations, however, remains to be seen.
2) Impact Aid Packs a Wallop. The ARRA statute specified that stabilization funds could be used for any purpose under the ESEA statute, including Impact Aid. Impact Aid is a federal program for school districts in which there is a federal presence, almost always a military base, that negatively impacts local revenues (a municipality cannot tax federal property).
Impact Aid is the mother of all block grants, and rightly so, because it is there to supplement local revenues, not drive reform for poor, minority, and disabled children. But in the context of ARRA, the Impact Aid provision, at least as interpreted by the Department, turns out also to be the mother of all loopholes.
The Guidance states that:
"Because the ESEA includes the broad Impact Aid authority (see Title VIII of the ESEA), an LEA may use Education Stabilization funds for activities that would be allowable under Impact Aid. This flexibility applies to all LEAs that receive Education Stabilization funds, and is not limited to those LEAs that also receive Impact Aid funds." [emphasis added].
So, pretty much, anything goes, for any district. For example, the guidance says that stabilization funds cannot be spent on frivolous items like "an aquarium, zoo, golf course, or swimming pool." But could a district use stabilization funds to pay down debt incurred from purchasing such frivolous items, or from other less flagrant but still egregious practices, including mis- or malfeasance on the part of local officials? The Impact Aid provision, as interpreted by the Department, suggests that the answer is: "yes".
3) Statewide Reform Gutted. The fallout from the Impact Aid provision should have been mitigated by the fact that in exchange for stabilization funding, the Governor has to assure the feds that he or she will undertake reform in the four areas laid out by Congress: standards and assessments; teacher effectiveness and the equitable distribution of good teachers; data systems; and, turning around underperforming schools.
But, the guidance explicitly tells Governors that they cannot dictate to districts how to spend the funds. And locals are free to disregard any reforms initiated by the Governor. This is a mind-boggling development.
Let’s say a Governor, using stabilization money, devises statewide "college and career ready" standards and a statewide assessment system aligned with them. This is great, and in keeping with what the Secretary says he wants. Except that every district is free to say "no thanks," ignore the Governor, and continue to use a system that is easier and makes them look better. Or they could pick up the system, but ignore the accommodations for limited English proficient students and children with disabilities worked out between the Governor and the Secretary. This dynamic can easily be extrapolated to the other 3 assurances.
Calling what the guidance does to the statute a "loophole" with regard to statewide reform would suggest a favorable, and in this case inaccurate, comparison of what remains of the statute with confetti.
Last Stop for Reform: Race to the Top. All of this enormously raises the stakes for the Race to the Top fund.
The Secretary has been saying all the right things on "Race to the Top" and although some say $5 billion is a drop in the bucket, it is more than one-third of what Title I was just a scant two months ago. In my opinion, it could do a lot. Much more has been done at the federal level with a lot less money. Title I was "only" $8.8 billion in 2001 when NCLB was passed, and that was for all 50 states and territories; Race to the Top is only for the upper tier or vanguard states.
I’m not sure it is fair to rate Governors on use of the stabilization money, as the Secretary has said he intends to do, given that they have been completely disempowered. But some evaluation of state willingness to undertake reform, in part based on their track record, will be necessary. Here, the "metrics" sketched out in the cover letter to states, which will be followed by a more specific proposal to be published "soon" in the Federal Register, will be key in setting the stage for the Race to the Top initiative. Stay tuned for a close look at this in a subsequent post.